ACADEMIC

project on environmental scarcities, state capacity, & civil violence

The Case Study of Indonesia – Notes

by Charles Victor Barber
World Resources Institute
Cambridge: American Academy of Arts and Sciences and the University of Toronto, 1997

Notes

  1. Thomas Homer-Dixon, “Environmental Scarcities and Violent Conflict: Evidence from Cases,” International Security 19, no. 1 (summer 1994), pp. 5-40; Thomas Homer-Dixon, J.H. Boutwell, and G.W. Rathjens, “Environmental Change and Violent Conflict: Growing Scarcities of Renewable Resources can Contribute to Social Instability and Civil Strife,” Scientific American (February 1993), pp. 38-45.
  2. Thomas Homer-Dixon, “Some Preliminary Ideas Regarding Causal Links Between Environmental Scarcity, State Capacity and Civil Violence,” (Unpublished manuscript, University of Toronto: Project on Environmental Scarcities, State Capacity, and Civil Violence, Trudeau Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies, University of Toronto and the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1994), p. 2.
  3. Thomas Homer-Dixon, “The Ingenuity Gap: Can Poor Countries Adapt to Resource Scarcity?,” Population and Development Review 21, no. 3 (September 1995), pp. 587-612.
  4. Joel Migdal, Strong Societies and Weak States: State-Society Relations and State Capabilities in the Third World (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988), p. 19.
  5. Homer-Dixon, “Some Preliminary Ideas,” p. 1.
  6. In the Philippines, for example, any analysis of the state that does not address the very strong role of NGOs would be seriously defective. As Goertzen notes, “To an extent greater than anywhere else in the region, so-called Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) have taken over from the government the work of improving the lot of the poor majority, through political, cultural, and economic programmes. The irony of their success is that even the government seems happy to see NGOs assume part of its functions” (D. Goertzen, “Agents for Change: NGOs Take the Lead in the Development Process,” Far Eastern Economic Review [August 8, 1991], pp. 20-22).
  7. B. Rich, Mortgaging the Earth: The World Bank, Environmental Impoverishment, and the Crisis of Development (Boston: Beacon Press, 1994), pp. 189-199; R.F. Mikesell and L.F. Williams, International Banks and the Environment. From Growth to Sustainability: An Unfinished Agenda (San Francisco: Sierra Club Books, 1992), pp. 32-33.
  8. Thomas Homer-Dixon, personal communication (January 15, 1996); Homer-Dixon, “Environmental Scarcities and Violent Conflict,” and Thomas Homer-Dixon, personal communication (November 26, 1994).
  9. World Bank, Indonesia: Stability, Growth and Equity in Repelita VI (Washington D.C.: Report No. 12857-IND, 1994), p. vii.
  10. See, for example, M.M. Cernea, Putting People First: Sociological Variables in Rural Development, Second Edition (Oxford: Oxford University Press and the World Bank, 1991); World Commission on Environment and Development (WCED), Our Common Future (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987).
  11. Rich, Mortgaging the Earth, pp. 182-199.
  12. World Bank, Indonesia Forestry Sector Review (Draft, Jakarta, 1993), p. 18..
  13. World Bank, Indonesia: Environment and Development: Challenges for the Future (Washington D.C.: Report No. 12083-IND, 1994), pp. 14-15.
  14. Booth states that these calculations are based on the government’s official poverty line, which is very low compared to those used in neighboring countries (A. Booth, “Repelita VI and the Second Long-Term Development Plan,” Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies 30, no. 3 [December 1994], pp. 3-39 at 36). The World Bank points out that many Indonesians are only slightly above this poverty line (and would thus be counted as poor in neighboring countries, according to Booth), vulnerable to even a small decline in their economic circumstances (World Bank, Indonesia Poverty Assessment and Strategy Report [Washington D.C., 1990], p. 13). All observers — as well as the government — agree that poverty reduction has been geographically uneven, with substantial advances on Java offset by considerable remaining pockets of poverty in other areas, particularly in Eastern Indonesia (The Government of Indonesia [GOI], Rencana Pembangunan Lima Tahun Keenam: 1994/95 – 1998/99, Chapter Nine [Sixth Five-Year Development Plan: 1994/95 – 1998/99], pp. 58-66). Booth concludes, though, that even allowing for these qualifications, “few dispute the magnitude of Indonesia’s achievement over the last 25 years in reducing the extent of destitution, especially in Java” (Booth, “Repelita VI,” p. 36).
  15. Jones concludes that “one of the most significant achievements of the New Order regime has been the expansion of education to the point where universal primary education has been almost attained; this also means that illiteracy has almost disappeared among the younger population” (G.W. Jones, “Labor Force and Education,” in Indonesia’s New Order: The Dynamics of Socio-Economic Transformation, ed. H. Hill [St. Leonards, Australia: Allen and Unwin, 1994], p. 161). Booth agrees that substantial progress has been made, but argues that primary schools still have “major problems.” Many buildings are in poor repair, teaching materials are inadequate, the poorly paid teachers lack the motivation to devote their attention to the curriculum, or to even show up at school on a regular basis in many cases (Booth, “Repelita VI,” p. 31).
  16. World Bank, Indonesia: Environment and Development, p. 11.
  17. Numbering only 4-5 million, Indonesia’s ethnic Chinese wield economic power far beyond their numbers, but are the target of widespread popular suspicion and discrimination. The top Chinese-Indonesian businessmen without doubt are the wealthiest in the country, but they cannot transform their economic power into political influence except through personalistic connections with the authorities. Smaller ethnic Chinese businessmen, meanwhile, are constant targets for bribery demands from low level officials. Whether big or small, “political vulnerability as members of an unpopular minority leaves them in a precarious position which constrains their ability to alter this situation much” (J. Mackie and A. MacIntyre, “Politics,” in Indonesia’s New Order: The Dynamics of Socio-Economic Transformation, ed. H. Hill [St. Leonards, Australia: Allen and Unwin, 1994], pp. 1-53 at 33).
  18. “And Then the Children: Alleged Privileges Under Public Scrutiny,” Indonesian Business Weekly 10 (July 24, 1995), pp. 10-11; A. Schwarz, A Nation in Waiting: Indonesia in the 1990s (St. Leonards, Australia, Allen and Unwin, 1994), pp. 146-147; T. Clifton, “Suharto’s Legacy,” Newsweek (July 4, 1994), pp. 6-9. After Newsweek’s Asia edition published Clifton’s cover story on the Soeharto family’s business activities in July 1994, the magazine was indefinitely banned by the government (“And Then the Children,” Indonesian Business Weekly, 1995).
  19. S. Berfield and K. Loveard, “Suharto Under Fire,” Asia Week (August 19, 1996), p. 17. According to Newsweek, when Soeharto was shown a leaflet for a Megawati speech accusing him of “tyranny,” he “exploded [and] ordered his military to quash the forum and expel Megawati’s supporters” (R. Moreau and T. Emerson, “People Power,” Newsweek [August 12, 1996], pp. 20-24 at 20).
  20. J. McBeth and M. Cohen, “Streets of Fire: The government responds with an old-fashioned crackdown as the worst riots in decades rack the Suharto regime and investors redo their political-risk calculations,” Far Eastern Economic Review (August 8, 1996), p. 14.
  21. In Soeharto’s view, the riots were nothing more than a resurgence of the banned Communist Party of Indonesia (PKI) which has always been his justification for harsh political measures. In a briefing for skeptical foreign diplomats in early August, according to one invitee, “the whole thing was communist, communist, communist and it didn’t go much beyond that” (J. McBeth, “Hunting Season: The government goes searching for alleged subversives in a thinly disguised bid to nip the nascent democracy movement growing around ousted PDI leader Megawati,” Far Eastern Economic Review [August 15, 1996], p. 14).
  22. Entering Indonesia through the Medan (Sumatra) airport in late August 1996, the author’s bags were meticulously searched — the first time in dozens of visits to Indonesia over eighteen years — and multiple copies of two environmental policy reports were scrutinized by customs officials at length, presumably for subversive content, while another official grilled the author on what the reports were about.
  23. The Far Eastern Economic Review quoted army sources as saying that many colonels and brigadier generals were privately appalled at the government’s response to the PDI situation. “They think the old man has lost his touch,” said one. “The government is using an atomic bomb to kill a fly. Where’s all the old finesse, where’s all the delicate maneuvering?” (McBeth and Cohen, “Streets of Fire,” p. 14).
  24. World Bank, Indonesia: Improving Efficiency and Equity — Changes in the Public Sectors Role (Washington DC: 1995); World Bank, Indonesia: Environment and Development.
  25. Homer-Dixon, “The Ingenuity Gap,” p. 590.
  26. McBeth, “Hunting Season.”
  27. Schwarz, A Nation in Waiting, p. 8
  28. A.B. Nasution, The Aspiration for Constitutional Government in Indonesia: A Socio-Legal Study of the Indonesian Contituante 1956-1959 (Jakarta: Pustaka Sinar Harapan, 1992), p. 412, as cited in Schwarz, A Nation in Waiting, p. 9.
  29. R.W. Liddle, “Indonesia’s Democratic Past and Future,” Comparative Politics 24, no. 4 (July 1992), p. 449, as cited in Schwarz, A Nation in Waiting, p. 10.
  30. B. Anderson, “Elections and Democratisation in Southeast Asia: Thailand, the Philippines and Indonesia,” a lecture broadcast on the Indian Pacific program of the Australian Broadcasting Corporation, and published in ABC Radio 24 Hours (September 1992), p. 58, as cited in Schwarz, A Nation in Waiting, p. 11.
  31. M.C. Ricklefs, A History of Modern Indonesia (London: The MacMillan Press, 1981), pp. 236-237.
  32. Ibid, p. 238.
  33. Schwarz, A Nation in Waiting, p. 16
  34. Santri refers to more purist followers of Islam, in contrast to the abangan group, which is generally of a poorer socioeconomic class and practices a more syncretic Islam, with many elements of Javanese mysticism (C. Geertz, The Religion of Java [Glencoe, IL: Free Press, 1960], pp. 121-130).
  35. J. Bresnan, Managing Indonesia: The Modern Political Economy (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), pp. 19-20.
  36. Schwarz, A Nation in Waiting, p. 15
  37. Dwfungsi has in the 1990s found an appreciative audience in the Burmese military. Searching for a way to maintain power and international acceptance, in the wake of the release from house arrest of opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi, senior Burmese generals are said to be strongly attracted to the Indonesian model (J. McBeth and B. Lintner, “Model State: Burma’s Generals Want Indonesian-Style Politics,” Far Eastern Economic Review [August 17, 1995], p. 27).
  38. In 1958, the Sukarno government nationalized Dutch companies in retaliation for their stance on West Irian, and numerous British and American companies as part of Konfrontasi. As a result of these nationalization measures, some 800 firms came under government control.
  39. One widely cited 1966 analysis concludes that the coup was largely the result of internal army divisions with little if any PKI involvement (B. Anderson and R. McVey, A Preliminary Analysis of the October 1, 1965 Coup in Indonesia [Ithaca, NY: Cornell Modern Indonesia Project, 1971]). A number of leftist analyses ascribe an important role to the US government, particularly the CIA (see, for example, P. D. Scott, “Exporting Military-Economic Development — America and the Overthrow of Sukarno, 1965-67,” in Ten Years’ Military Terror in Indonesia, ed. M. Caldwell [Nottingham, UK: Spokesman Books, 1975], pp. 209-264). The New Order regime, meanwhile has long maintained that the Chinese Communists played a significant role in assisting the PKI, and broke diplomatic relations with China for decades on this basis (see Bresnan, Managing Indonesia, pp. 24-25). One school of thought assigns a shadowy role to Soeharto himself in orchestrating, or at least having prior knowledge of, the coup attempt.
  40. M.R.J. Vatakiotis, Indonesian Politics Under Suharto (London: Routledge, 1994), p. 2.
  41. Central Intelligence Agency, Intelligence Report: Indonesia 1965, The Coup that Backfired (Washington DC, 1968), p. 71, as cited in Schwarz, A Nation in Waiting, p. 20. Indeed, the anti-PKI killings attracted relatively little international attention or condemnation. Time magazine went as far as to call the slaughter “The West’s best news for years in Asia” (“Vengeance With a Smile,” Time [July 15, 1966], p. 26, as cited in Schwarz, A Nation in Waiting, p. 22).
  42. The commander of the paratrooper unit sent to Central Java, Sarwo Edhie, later admitted that “In Solo, we gathered together the youth, the nationalist groups, and the religious organizations. We gave them two or three days training, then sent them out to kill the communists” (H. McDonald, Suharto’s Indonesia [Blackburn, Australia: Fontana, 1980], p. 52).
  43. Bresnan, Managing Indonesia, pp. 14-15.
  44. R. Cribb, “Problems in the Historiography of the Killings in Indonesia,” The Indonesian Killings, 1965-1966: Studies from Java and Bali, ed. R. Cribb (Clayton: Centre for Southeast Asian Studies, 1990), pp. 3 and 21, as cited in Schwarz, A Nation in Waiting, p. 21.
  45. Schwarz, A Nation in Waiting, pp. 22-23.
  46. Bresnan, Managing Indonesia, p. 43.
  47. Like the 30 September coup, the events leading up to the issuance of Supersemar are still murky. The army had been outraged by the appointment of a new cabinet on 21 February in which they saw their influence diminished and a number of pro-PKI ministers retained. The full cabinet met on 11 March (absent Soeharto, pleading a sore throat) with students demonstrating outside. Sukarno received a note shortly into the meeting saying that unidentified troops were assembling outside, and promptly fled by helicopter to his retreat in Bogor, in the hills outside Jakarta. Major General Amir Machmud then left the meeting to tell Soeharto what had happened. Soeharto and the army firmly deny to this day that they drafted Supersemar and pressured Sukarno to sign it, wanting to avoid any appearance of a military take-over. The actual letter emerged from a meeting between Sukarno and three generals (including Machmud) dispatched by Soeharto to, in Machmud’s words, reassure Sukarno that “the army could keep the situation under control if given the full confidence of the President” (Schwarz, A Nation in Waiting, p. 25).
  48. H. Crouch, The Army and Politics in Indonesia (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1978), as cited in Schwarz, A Nation in Waiting, p. 26.
  49. Soeharto, My Thoughts, Words and Deeds: An Autobiography (Jakarta: Citra Lamtoro Gung Persada, 1991), p. 148.
  50. Schwarz, A Nation in Waiting, p. 20. Only in August 1995, in conjunction with Indonesia’s Fiftieth Independence Day celebration, did Soeharto finally announce that the “ET” stamp (short for “Ex-Tapol,” meaning Ex-Political Prisoner) on the national identity cards of 1.3 million citizens branded as somehow “involved” with the communists and their alleged coup would be removed. Those branded with the ET stamp and their families have found it hard to get government jobs or bank loans (“Indonesia: End to Blacklist,” Far Eastern Economic Review [August 17, 1995], p. 13). In 1996, however, Soeharto once again blamed — and arrested — alleged communists for the July riots over leadership of the Indonesian Democratic Party, as noted in Section I.
  51. Soeharto himself states in his autobiography (Soeharto, My Thoughts, Words and Deeds, as cited in Vatakiotis, Indonesian Politics Under Suharto, p. 9) referring to this receipt in 1985 of an FAO award for attaining self-sufficiency in rice: “Imagine someone who more than sixty years ago was a child bathing in the mud, leading a peasant’s life in Kemusuk village, stepping up to the podium and delivering a speech in front of assembled world experts, as a leader who had just solved the most important issue for 160 million mouths.”
  52. Schwarz, A Nation in Waiting, p. 22.
  53. Real per capita GDP actually shrunk in 1960-65 (see Hill, “The Economy,” in Indonesia’s New Order, p. 57) and by 1965 annual inflation was running at 500 percent, while the price of rice was rising at an annual rate of 900 percent. In the course of that one year, the black market Rupiah/Dollar rate plunged from 5,100 to 50,000 (Ricklefs, A History of Modern Indonesia, p. 268). Foreign exchange receipts from plantations, one of the most important export sectors, declined from $442 million in 1958 to $330 million in 1966. (Schwarz, A Nation in Waiting, p. 18). Oil production stagnated. “Economic deprivation was now widespread in the society, and for many had reached a severity unknown since the years of wartime occupation” (Bresnan, Managing Indonesia, p. 52). Compounding the crisis, parts of Java and Bali experienced the worst drought in living memory in the last months of 1963 and early 1964: Reuters reported in early 1964 that one million people were starving in Central Java alone (Bresnan, Managing Indonesia, p. 19).
  54. Vatakiotis, Indonesian Politics Under Suharto, p. 4.
  55. World Bank, Indonesia: Stability, Growth and Equity in Repelita VI, p. vii.
  56. When a debate between Minister Habibie and the Minister of Finance over the amount of state funds to be allocated to the former’s ambitious project to refit ex-East German Navy vessels and expand harbors spilled into the press in mid-1994, Soeharto responded in June by banning three leading news weeklies, including Tempo, the nation’s premier magazine of business and politics. And the loan of $190 million from the national reforestation fund (discussed in Section III) made by Soeharto to Habibie’s state aircraft concern occasioned an NGO lawsuit against the president — and a great deal of international publicity and public debate.
  57. Schwarz, A Nation in Waiting, p. 53.
  58. Ibid.
  59. M. Pangestu and I.J. Azis, “Survey of Recent Developments,” Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies 30, no. 2 (August 1994): 3-47 at 24-25; Schwarz, A Nation in Waiting, pp. 133-161.
  60. Bresnan, Managing Indonesia, p. 73.
  61. Vatakiotis, Indonesian Politics Under Suharto, pp. 43-45.
  62. R.W. Liddle, “The Relative Autonomy of the Third World Politician: Soeharto and Indonesian Economic Development in Comparative Perspective,” International Studies Quarterly 35, no. 4 (July, 1991), p. 419, as cited in Schwarz, A Nation in Waiting, p. 53. “It is therefore a mistake to view the change in regime in 1966 as a switch from a `socialist’ to a `capitalist’ or `free market’ regime. There remains a deep-seated mistrust of market forces, economic liberalism, and private (especially Chinese) ownership in many influential quarters in Indonesia. . . . [S]ince 1966, the policy pendulum has swung back and forth between periods of more or less economic intervention” (H. Hill, “The Economy,” in Indonesia’s New Order: The Dynamics of Socio-Economic Transformation, ed. H. Hill [St. Leonards, Australia: Allen and Unwin, 1994], p. 66).
  63. Hill, “The Economy,” in Indonesia’s New Order, pp. 62-63.
  64. Government of Indonesia and the International Institute for Environment and Development (GOI/IIED), Forest Policies in Indonesia: The Sustainable Development of Forest Lands, Volume III (Jakarta, 1985), pp. 111-115.
  65. J. Romm, Forest Development in Indonesia and the Productive Transformation of Capital (presented at the Ninth Annual Conference on Indonesian Studies, Berkeley, California, 31 July – 3 August 1980), p. 3.
  66. M. Gillis, “Indonesia: Public Policies, Resource Management, and the Tropical Forest,” in Public Policies and the Misuse of Forest Resources, eds. R. Repetto and M. Gillis (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), pp. 43-113 at 54.
  67. Government of Indonesia and United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (GOI/FAO), Situation and Outlook of Forestry Sector in Indonesia, Volume I (Jakarta: 1990), p. 56.
  68. As summarized by a leading technocrat, the argument which has at least temporarily won the day for liberalization is as follows: “Economic growth and development require export growth to pay for imports and to service debt. Reliable export growth requires nonoil exports from agriculture and manufacturing. Nonoil export growth requires an efficient, productive economy, which needs a competitive domestic market. [Since] protectionist policies and government controls [are] inimical to [this] creating instead the present high-cost economy, they need to be dismantled, i.e., the economy deregulated” (A. Wardhana, “Structural Adjustment in Indonesia: Export and the `High-Cost’ Economy,” speech to the 24th Conference of Southeast Asian Central Bank Governors, Bangkok. [January 25, 1989]. As cited in Schwarz, Nation in Waiting, p. 56).
  69. World Bank, Indonesia: Environment and Development, pp. 14-15.
  70. US Embassy, “Protection versus Profits: Indonesia’s Forestry Sector,” unclassified cable from the US Ambassador to Indonesia to the US Secretary of State (March 30, 1994), p. 3.
  71. World Bank, Indonesia: Environment and Development, p. 50.
  72. World Bank, Indonesia — Agricultural Transformation: Challenges and Opportunities (Washington: 1992), p. 56.
  73. Hill, “The Economy,” in Indonesia’s New Order, p. 72.
  74. World Bank, Indonesia: Stability, Growth and Equity in Repelita IV (Washington, DC, 1994), pp. 53-63.
  75. Government of Indonesia (GOI), Rencana Pembangunan Lima Tahun Keenam: 1994/95-1998/99 [Sixth Year Development Plan: 1994/95 – 1998/99], Chapter 22 (6 volumes, 1994), p. 128.
  76. Ibid., p. 111.
  77. Hill, “The Economy,” in Indonesia’s New Order, p. 106.
  78. J. McBeth, “Social Dynamite,” Far Eastern Economic Review (February 15, 1996), pp. 20-22.
  79. Schwarz, A Nation in Waiting, p. 32.
  80. Ibid., pp. 31 and 33.
  81. Soeharto, My Thoughts, Words and Deeds, pp. 221 and 226, as cited in Schwarz, A Nation in Waiting, p. 32. The conflict over leadership of the PDI and resulting riots in 1996, of course, indicates that many are not as pleased as Soeharto with the current electoral system.
  82. “Megawati barred from 1997 poll,” Jakarta Post (July 3, 1996), p. 1.
  83. Korpri incessantly reinforces adherence to Pancasila and “monoloyalty” to the regime, as well as serving as an important component of Golkar’s electoral machine. The wives of all civil servants must join a parallel group called Dharma Wanita, assuming a rank pegged to their husband’s position. This group “inculcates an ethos of unquestioning obedience and acceptance of hierarchy and discourages independent thinking on political or social issues” (Mackie and MacIntyre, “Politics,” p. 27).
  84. Bresnan, Managing Indonesia, p. 105.
  85. Vatakiotis, Indonesian Politics Under Suharto, pp. 70-71.
  86. J. Mackie and A. MacIntyre, “Politics,” in Indonesia’s New Order: The Dynamics of Socio-Economic Transformation, ed. H. Hill (St. Leonards, Australia: Allen and Unwin, 1994), pp. 22.
  87. Use of these terms, all Javanese, provoked considerable resentment in other parts of the country with long traditions of local government and their own languages.
  88. P. Guiness, “Local Society and Culture,” in Indonesia’s New Order: The Dynamics of Socio-Economic Transformation, ed. H. Hill (St. Leonard’s, Australia: Allen and Unwin, 1994), pp. 267-304 at 273-275.
  89. K.D. Jackson, “Bureaucratic Polity: A Theoretical Framework for the Analysis of Power and Communications in Indonesia,” in Political Power and Communications in Indonesia, eds. K.D. Jackson and L.W. Pye (Berkeley, California: University of California Press, 1978), pp. 23-42 at 34-35.
  90. H.S. Shin, Demystifying the Capitalist State: Political Patronage, Bureaucratic Interests, and Capitalists-in-Formation in Soeharto’s Indonesia (Ph.D. Dissertation, Yale University, New Haven, CT, 1989), pp. 71-79.
  91. Schwarz, A Nation in Waiting, p. 112.
  92. R. Pura, “Bob Hasan Builds an Empire in the Forest,” Asian Wall Street Journal (January 20-21, 1995), p. 1.
  93. Mackie and MacIntryre, “Politics,” pp. 22-23.
  94. R. Pura, “Suharto Lawyers Ask Court to Reject Suit Over Decree,” Asian Wall Street Journal (November 1, 1994), p. 1.
  95. Guiness, “Local Society and Culture,” p. 269
  96. M.R. Dove, “Introduction: Traditional Culture and Development in Contemporary Indonesia,” in ed. M.R. Dove, The Real and Imagined Role of Culture in Development: Case Studies from Indonesia (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1988), pp. 1-37 at 29 and 31.
  97. A member of the Indonesian delegation to the March 1995 UN Social Summit in Copenhagen stressed this point to the press, presenting as a fact her opinion that there are no “indigenous people” in Indonesia distinct from the majority. “What we have is people in remote and isolated communities” (“Indonesia Likely To Play Active Role at Global Summit,” Jakarta Post [February 23, 1995], p. 2).
  98. P. Evers, A Preliminary Analysis of Land Rights and Indigenous People in Indonesia (Jakarta: World Bank, Draft Working Paper 1995), pp. 7-8.
  99. The inherent conflict between Bali’s polytheistic Hinduism and Pancasila’s uncompromising monotheism has apparently been swept under the rug due to the power of Bali’s culture as a tourist draw, or resolved through some form of theological legerdemain by the Ministry of Religion.
  100. Swidden agriculture — also called shifting cultivation — is perhaps the most common form of agriculture for nonrice crops in Southeast Asia. Essentially, it is a system in which patches of forest are cut, burned to improve fertility, and then farmed. The first few years, crop yields are high. As yields drop due to declining soil fertility or invasions by weeds and pests, the plot is abandoned and the cycle begins anew on another patch of forest nearby. In most systems, the abandoned fields are left to fallow for years or decades before being cut and farmed again. Crops in swidden systems tend to be diverse, in order to stagger labor requirements throughout the year and ensure against the loss (by pests or severe storms, for example), of one crop. A stable and sustainable system under low population densities, and often well-suited ecologically to relatively poor forest soils, swidden systems can easily break down where new markets, increasing populations, or restricted access to land forces farmers to shorten fallow periods (D. Capistrano and G.G. Marten, “Agriculture in Southeast Asia,” in Traditional Agriculture in Southeast Asia: A Human Ecology Perspective, ed. G.G. Marten [Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1986], pp. 6-19 at 13-14).
  101. J.A. Weinstock, Study on Shifting Cultivation in Indonesia. Phase I Report (Draft) (Jakarta: Government of Indonesia[GOI]/UN Food and Agriculture Organization [FAO] Project UTF/INS/065/INS, 1989), pp. 1 and 186.
  102. M.R. Dove, “The Agroecological Mythology of the Javanese and the Political Economy of Indonesia,” Indonesia 39 (1988), pp. 1-36.
  103. C.V. Barber, N. Johnson, and E. Hafild, Breaking the Logjam: Obstacles to Forest Policy Reforming Indonesia and the United States (Washington DC: World Resources Institute, 1994), p. 78.
  104. Government of Indonesia (GOI), Indonesia Forestry Action Programme, Volume II (Jakarta: 1991), p. 22.
  105. GOI, Rencana Pembangunan Lima Tahun Keenam, Chapter 29, p. 421.
  106. In the case of the Kubu, a nomadic forest-dwelling tribe in Sumatra, a recent World Bank transmigration review concluded that neighboring transmigration projects have had “a major negative and probably irreversible impact” (World Bank, Indonesia Transmigration Program: A Review of Five Bank-Supported Projects [Washington, DC: Report No. 12988, 1994], p. 22). Other observers have characterized the program as “Javanese colonialism” (P. Shenon, “Rearranging the Population: Indonesia Weighs the Pluses and Minuses,” New York Times [October 8, 1992], p. A12).
  107. Guiness, “Local Society and Culture, p. 272.”
  108. In a variation on this theme, Soeharto used the August 1995 Fiftieth Independence Day celebration to pardon a number of Sukarno-era government figures implicated in and imprisoned since the events of 1965-66.
  109. As of mid-1995, a new and even more restrictive law governing NGO activities and funding was reported to be in the drafting process.
  110. S. Aznam, “Passport Control: New Immigration Law Can Render Citizens Stateless,” Far Eastern Review (March 26, 1992), p. 18.
  111. G. Rannis and F. Stewart, “Decentralisation in Indonesia,” Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies 30, no. 3 (December 1994), pp. 41-72.
  112. Jackson, “Bureaucratic Polity: A Theoretical Framework, p. 11.”
  113. Bresnan, Managing Indonesia, pp. 105-106. From 1974 to 1983, the bureaucracy grew from 1.67 million to 2.63 million civil servants, and state-owned enterprises grew to account for 25 percent of GDP (Vatakiotis, Indonesian Politics Under Suharto, p. 37). By 1986, the civil service exceeded 3 million, a five-fold increase since 1963.
  114. The time may come when Indonesia will take the advice proffered by the Far Eastern Economic Review editorial page and actually refuse all or part of the $5.3 billion in aid pledged for 1995 by the Consultative Group on Indonesia, a World Bank-led donor consortium, and instead seek private sector sources for development projects (“Banned Aid: Why Jakarta Should Say No,” Far Eastern Economic Review [August 17, 1995], p. 5).
  115. Concerning the current Five-Year Plan, Booth notes that: “As is usual in the successive plan documents in New Order Indonesia, the emphasis is on generalized expressions of policy intent, usually couched in language sufficiently vague to avoid confronting particular interest groups. Thus the reader searching . . . (for) rigorous analysis of economic policy issues is likely to be disappointed. On the other hand, the document does discuss macroeconomic and sectoral targets, often in considerable detail” (Booth, “Repelita VI,” p. 3).
  116. GOI, Indonesia Forestry Action Programme.
  117. Bappenas, Biodiversity Action Plan for Indonesia (Jakarta, 1993).
  118. For a comparative review of biodiversity planning experiences in seventeen countries, including Indonesia, see K. Miller and S. Lanou, National Biodiversity Planning: Guidelines Based on Early Experiences Around the World (Washington DC: World Resources Institute, The World Conservation Union [IUCN], and United Nations Environment Programme, 1995).
  119. Jackson notes that the Javanese concept of political power, which esteems the passive-yet-powerful leader who seems to not need to exert himself to achieve his ends, may partly account for the gulf between planning and action: “As designing plans is relatively passive while implementation requires action, attention and high status go with the former rather than the latter. Progress in bureaucracies is often impressive until the moment when implementation is required” (K.D. Jackson, “The Political Implications of Structure and Culture in Indonesia,” in Political Power and Communications in Indonesia, eds. K.D. Jackson and L.W. Pye [Berkeley: University of California Press. 1978], pp. 23-42 at 39).
  120. Cernea, Putting People First; ed. M. Poffenberger, Keepers of the Forest: Land Management Alternatives in Southeast Asia (West Hartford, CT: Kumarian Press, 1990).
  121. Booth, “Repelita VI,” p. 37
  122. Mackie and MacIntryre, “Politics,” p. 21.
  123. Jackson, “Bureaucratic Polity: A Theoretical Framework,” pp. 8-9.
  124. World Bank, Indonesia: Improving Efficiency and Equity, p. xxvi.
  125. J. Solomon and H. Sender, “Souring Sentinment: Riots Send Shudders Through Investors,” Far Eastern Economic Review (August 8, 1996), p. 16.
  126. Schwarz, A Nation in Waiting, p. 137.
  127. Ibid., p. 136.
  128. “And Then the Children,” Indonesian Business Weekly, p. 11.
  129. Soeharto, “Annual Independence Day Speech, August 17, 1996,” as quoted in Economy and Business Review Indonesia, no. 228 (August 28, 1996), p. 33.
  130. McBeth and Cohen, “Streets of Fire,” p. 15.
  131. B. Anderson, “The Idea of Power in Javanese Culture,” in Culture and Politics in Indonesia, eds. C. Holt et al. (Ithaca, NY: Cornell Modern Indonesia Project, 1972), pp. 1-69. As one high forestry official said in an international meeting, “we never reform policies in Indonesia, we only improve them.”
  132. GOI/IIED, Forest Policies in Indonesia, Volume III, p. 82.
  133. N. L. Peluso, Rich Forests, Poor People: Resource Control and Resistance on Java (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1992), pp. 27-160.
  134. World Bank, Indonesia Forestry Sector Review (Jakarta: Draft, April 1993), p. iii.
  135. Government of Indonesia and the Asian Development Bank (ADB), Community Participation in Forest Management, Mid-Term Report, Forest Sector Policy Analysis Working Paper No. 5 (Jakarta: ADB Project Preparation Technical Assistance T.A. No. 1781-INO, 1994); Poffenberger, Keepers of the Forest.
  136. GOI, Rencana Pembangunan Lima Tahun Keenam, Chapter 26, p. 327.
  137. GOI, Indonesia Forestry Action Programme, Volume I, p. 9.
  138. Bappenas, Biodiversity Action Plan for Indonesia (Jakarta, 1993), pp. 1-2.
  139. Dick, Forest Land Use. Lowland evergreen forest predominates among the many forest types and is one of the richest dryland plant communities in the world. In Borneo, for instance, it is estimated that the forest contains 1,800 to 2,300 tree species larger than 10 cm in diameter, and that some 40 plant genera and many more species are endemic. Of the 650 bird species known or presumed to breed on the Sunda shelf (which includes Peninsular Malaysia, Sumatra, Borneo and Java), 291 inhabit inland lowland forests (D.R. Wells, “Survival of the Malaysian Bird Fauna,” Malayan Nature Journal, vol. 24 [1971] pp. 248-256). Dipterocarpaceae, with some 386 species in western Indonesia, dominate these forests and yield the most commercial hardwood.
  140. C. Zerner, Indigenous Forest-Dwelling Communities in Indonesia’s Outer Islands: Livelihood, Rights, and Environmental Management Institutions in the Era of Industrial Forest Exploitation, Consultancy Report prepared for the World Bank Indonesia Forestry Sector Policy Review (Washington, DC, Resource Planning Corporation, 1992), p. 4.
  141. GOI/IIED, Forest Policies in Indonesia, Volume III, p. 82.
  142. RePPProt, The Land Resources of Indonesia, p. 156.
  143. Government of Indonesia (GOI), Indonesia Forestry Action Programme, Volume II (Jakarta, 1991), pp. 38-39.
  144. GOI, Rencana Pembangunan Lima Tahun Keenam, Chapter 26, p. 327.
  145. Found in J. Dick, Forest Land Use, Forest Use Zonation, and Deforestation in Indonesia: A Summary and Interpretation of Existing Information, a background paper to the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) (Jakarta: Prepared for the Ministry of Environment, 1991), pp. 30-32.
  146. Dick’s relatively low estimate (Dick, Forest Land Use) is premised on the conclusion that previous higher estimates “assume that official tenure change is equivalent to actual conversion; assume that all causes or agents of deforestation are additive, whereas in fact smallholders, for example, will usually occupy land already disturbed (by logging, fire, etc.); and appear to assume that all area presently under shifting cultivation has been deforested in the last ten or fifteen years, whereas in fact shifting cultivators occupy much land which has never been forested (or has been cleared for many years)” (World Bank, Indonesia Forestry Sector Review, p. 18).
  147. Barber, Johnson, and Hafild, Breaking the Logjam, pp. 5-6.
  148. The four southern Sumatra provinces of Jambi, South Sumatra, Bengkulu, and Lampung had an average population growth rate of 3 percent, more than 50 percent higher than Indonesia’s overall 1.97 percent growth rate. While hard data on migration are difficult to come by for this and other regions, a 1992 study concluded that “high population growth implies the constant inflow of transmigrants (official and spontaneous) into the Region.” Combined with increasing levels of agricultural and industrial investment, the result is “increasing competition for land and forest resources between traditional users, transmigrants, logging concessions, and large estates. Social costs of environmental pressure are beginning to show, for example sedimentation and periodic flooding of river systems; shortages of fuelwood and building materials from deforestation; acidification from cultivating fragile peat soils” (Japan International Cooperation Agency [JICA], Study on the Integrated Regional Development Plan for the Southern Part of Sumatra, Prepared for the Ministry of Public Works, Republic of Indonesia [Jakarta: Draft Final Main Report Volume 2, 1992], pp. 20-21).
  149. Peluso, Rich Forests, Poor People, pp. 44-45.
  150. Ibid., p. 67.
  151. Schwarz, A Nation in Waiting, p. 8.
  152. GOI/FAO, Situation and Outlook of Forestry Sector in Indonesia, Volume IV, p. 169.
  153. R.M. Unger, Law in Modern Society: Toward a Criticism of Social Theory (New York: Free Press, 1976), p. 67.
  154. For example, GOI, Indonesia Forestry Action Programme; GOI/FAO, Situation and Outlook of Forestry Sector in Indonesia.
  155. J. Douglas, Organization for Production (Paper presented at the Ninth World Forestry Congress, Mexico City, July 1985).
  156. K.F. Wiersum, “International Experience in Social Forestry and Implications for Research Support,” Paper presented at the Conference on Planning and Implementation of Social Forestry Programs in Indonesia (Joygakarta: Gadjah Mada University, December 1-3, 1987).
  157. GOI/FAO, Situation and Outlook of Forestry Sector in Indonesia, Volume IV, p. 171.
  158. C.V. Barber et al., forthcoming, Conservation Policies and Politics on Sumatra’s Last Rainforest Frontier (Jakarta: World Resources Institute and Worldwide Fund for Nature Indonesia Program, title may change — due in early 1997).
  159. The official — but still partial — compilations of forestry laws and regulations issued every several years by the ministry’s legal staff now total eight volumes and more than 1,700 pages.
  160. World Bank, Indonesia Forestry Sector Review (Jakarta: Draft, April 1993), p. 11.
  161. R. Sedjo, Incentives and Distortions in Indonesian Forest Policy (Unpublished report prepared for World Bank, Jakarta, 1987), p. 8.
  162. Regional Physical Planning Programme for Transmigration (RePPProt), The Land Resources of Indonesia: A National Overview (Jakarta: Overseas Development Administration [UK] and Department of Transmigration [Indonesia], 1990), p. 159.
  163. GOI/FAO, Situation and Outlook of Forestry Sector in Indonesia, Volume II, pp. 140-141.
  164. World Bank, Indonesia Forestry Sector Review, p. 29.
  165. L. Potter, Forest Degradation and Reforestation in Kalimantan: Towards a Sustainable Land Use?, Paper presented at a conference on “Interactions of People and Forests in Kalimantan” (New York: Botanical Gardens, June 21-23, 1991), p. 2; H. Brookfield et al., “Borneo and the Malay Peninsula,” in B.L. Turner et al., The Earth as Transformed by Human Action (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1990).
  166. Potter, Forest Degradation and Reforestation in Kalimantan, p. 3.
  167. H. Thang, Forest Conservation Management Practices in Malaysia, Paper presented at workshop on “Realistic Strategies for Tropical Forests” (General Assembly of the World Conservation Union [IUCN], November 28-December 5, 1990). Even the government’s own Forestry Action Programme argues that “a thirty-five-year cycle may be only about half the length of time required to support a sustainable harvest in the long term,” though the Programme endorses “continuous monitoring and evaluation” rather than stricter cutting-cycle regulations (GOI, Indonesia Forestry Action Programme, Volume II, p. 57).
  168. Barber, Johnson, and Hafild, Breaking the Logjam, p. 48.
  169. GOI/FAO, Situation and Outlook of Forestry Sector in Indonesia, Volume IV, p. 33.
  170. World Bank, Indonesia Forestry Sector Review, p. 20.
  171. Bappenas, Biodiversity Action Plan for Indonesia (Jakarta, 1993), p. 78.
  172. J. de Beers and M. McDermott, The Economic Value of Non-Timber Forest Products in Southeast Asia (Amsterdam: Netherlands Committee for IUCN, 1989), p. 86.
  173. GOI/FAO, Situation and Outlook of Forestry Sector in Indonesia, Volume III, p. 45.
  174. E.A.M. Zuhud and Haryanto, Pelestarian Pemanfaatan Keanekaragaman Tumbuhan Obat Hutan Tropika Indonesia [Conservation and Utilization of the Diverse Medicinal Plants of Indonesia’s Tropical Forest] (Bogor: Bogor Agricultural Institute and the Indonesian Tropical Institute, 1994), p. xiv.
  175. T.H. Hull and G.W. Jones, “Demographic Perspectives,” in ed. H. Hill, Indonesia’s New Order: The Dynamics of Socio-Economic Transformation (St. Leonards, Australia: Allen and Unwin, 1994), pp. 123-178 at 125.
  176. T.H. Hull and V.J. Hull, “Population and Health Policies,” in The Oil Boom and After: Indonesian Economic Policy and Performance in the Soeharto Era, ed. A. Booth (London: Oxford University Press, 1992).
  177. GOI, Rencana Pembangunan Lima Tahun Keenam, Chapter 36, p. 330.
  178. Ibid., Chapter 26, p. 328.
  179. World Bank, Indonesia Forestry Sector Review, p. 38.
  180. H. Suharyanto and G. N. Munthe, “Tropical Forests: National Treasure Trove,” Indonesian Business Weekly (June 10, 1994), p. 4.
  181. “RI’s Pulp Exports Likely to Reach $2 Billion Mark this Year,” Jakarta Post (February 21,1995), p. 8.
  182. World Bank, Indonesia Forestry Sector Review, pp. 38-39.
  183. Ibid.
  184. Government of Indonesia and the Asian Development Bank (GOI/ADB), Evaluation of Forest Policy Regulatory Reforms (Jakarta: Mid-Term Report, Forest Sector Policy Analysis Working Paper No. 6, ADB Project Preparation Technical Assistance T.A. No. 1781-INO, 1994), p. 10.
  185. Between 1969 and 1994, production increases for key minerals were: tin, 550 percent; nickel, over 250 percent; phosphate, 25,000 percent; copper, over 10,000 percent; and gold, 16,000 percent. Coal production during this period increased by 4,300 percent (GOI, Rencana Pembangunan Lima Tahun Keenam, Chapter 25, pp. 261-263).
  186. C. Marr, Digging Deep: The Hidden Costs of Mining in Indonesia (London: Down to Earth and Minewatch, 1993), p. 34.
  187. GOI, Rencana Pembangunan Lima Tahun Keenam, Chapter 25, p. 289.
  188. Barber, Johnson, and Hafild, Breaking the Logjam, p. 4.
  189. Ibid., pp. 16-17.
  190. GOI, Rencana Pembangunan Lima Tahun Keenam, Chapter 26, p. 319.
  191. Ibid., Chapter 29, p. 421.
  192. World Bank, Indonesia: Sustaining Development (Washington, DC: World Bank, 1993), as cited in Barber, Johnson, and Hafild, Breaking the Logjam, p. 44.
  193. The Indonesian Forum for the Environment (WALHI), Sustainability and Economic Rent in the Indonesian Forestry Sector (Jakarta, 1991), pp. 11 and 23.
  194. World Bank, Indonesia: Sustaining Development (Washington, DC: World Bank, 1993), as cited in Barber, Johnson, and Hafild, Breaking the Logjam, p. 44.
  195. Ibid., pp. 18-19. Another recent study confirmed this analysis: “Several industrialists practicing intra-firm pricing compose a quasi-cartel. Their determination of log prices reflects neither the scarcity value of tropical logs nor the externalities involved in their exploitation. This allows Indonesians to value at only $70-80 per cubic meter the same Bornean species which Malaysians value at $140-165 per cubic meter” (WALHI/LBH, Mistaking Plantations for the Forest).
  196. GOI/FAO, Situation and Outlook of Forestry Sector in Indonesia, Volume I, p. 87.
  197. East Kalimantan Province, which accounts for 10 percent of Indonesia’s land area, contains 20 million hectares of legally recognized forestlands. Of this, 12 million hectares is held under 108 timber concessions. From 1980 through 1988, 25 percent of all logs produced in Indonesia came from East Kalimantan, peaking at 30 percent in 1984. Surveying the results of this massive timber boom, WALHI concluded that:
    • Commercial exploitable timber in East Kalimantan will be exhausted by 2003.
    • From 1985 through 1990, logging enterprises directly employed only about 2 percent of the population over ten years of age, while forest industries employed approximately another 4 percent.
    • Logging and forest industries in 1985 indirectly created an estimated 18 and 45 jobs, respectively, per 100 directly created jobs; but these jobs are offset by the still-uncalculated but most likely large loss of employment and income from local forest-based cottage industries (e.g., rattan collection) denied access to forest resources controlled by concession-holders.
    • Investment in the province’s forestry sector is becoming increasingly capital intensive, as shown by the ratios of jobs created per unit of investment (100 million rupiah; $50,000 at the 1991 rate) in both logging and forest industries. In logging, per unit jobs declined from nine in the 1970s to six in the late 1980s. In forest industries, per unit job creation declined from eleven to three during the same period.
    • From 1975 through 1989, only 28 percent of forestry taxes and levies returned to the province, and only 9 percent of what was returned was used for forestry conservation and development.

    The Indonesian Forum for the Environment (WALHI), HPH dan Ekonomi Regional: Kasus Kalimantan Timur [Timber Concessions and Regional Economics: The East Kalimantan Case] (Jakarta, 1993), pp. 51-52.

  198. Schwarz, A Nation in Waiting, p. 112.
  199. Indonesian Legal Aid Institute (LBH), “The Torching of the People’s Homes and the Destruction of Their Fields in Subdistrict Pulau Panggung, Lampung Selatan, Sumatra, Indonesia,” (unpublished report on file with author, Jakarta, May 1989).
  200. Barber, Johnson, and Hafild, Breaking the Logjam, p. 21.
  201. The Indonesian Forum for the Environment (WALHI) notes that “The Bentian case is one typical example of hundreds of similar cases from East Kalimantan. Most of the cases have so far remained undocumented due to the pervasive atmosphere of intimidation and censorship in the region” (WALHI, Indonesian Government-Sponsored “Development” and Logging Destroys Indigenous Peoples’ Sustainable Agroforestry System: Bentian Case, East Kalimantan Indonesia — Brief Notes and History [Jakarta: Unpublished Case Report, 1994], p. 1; see also WALHI, Kasus Rakyat Jelmu Sibak Melawan Bob Hasan [The Case of the People of Jelmu Sibak versus Bob Hasan] [Jakarta: Unpublished Case Report, 1995]).
  202. The Indonesian Forum for the Environment (WALHI) and Indonesian Legal Aid Institute (LBH), Mistaking Plantations for the Forest: Indonesia’s Pulp and Paper Industry, Communities, and the Environment (Jakarta, 1992), pp. 48-53.
  203. Barber, Johnson, and Hafild, Breaking the Logjam, pp. 72-73.
  204. Curiously, the local office of the provincial forestry service noted in a report on the conflict in August 1993 that “ex-communists” were involved in the forest clearing, and that it “smelled of politics” (Muara Enim [South Sumatra] Forestry Service Office, “Kasus Hutan Rimba Sekampung, Benakat” [“The Case of the Sekampung Natural Forest, Benakat”], [Palembang, South Sumatra, 1993], p. 5). (Internal forestry service report on file with author.) His main concern seems to have been, however, that the arrangement was made without the participation or consent of the local forestry apparatus.
  205. Benakat Solidarity Committee, Pernyataan Sikap Komite Slidaritas Untuk Marga Benakat [Position Paper of the Benakat Solidarity Community] (Palembang, South Aumatra: Indonesian Legal Aid Institute, 1994), p. 1-4. (Unpublished report on file with author.)
  206. In a letter to the Minister of Forestry in September 1994, the committee stated its views on the facts to date. The committee demanded that the minister immediately require MEL to cease activities in the Benakat forest and officially recognize the communities’ rights over it, that the appropriate legal authorities take action against all parties which violated the communities’ rights, that MEL immediately take action to rehabilitate the forest areas it had destroyed and provide compensation, and that the local military command withdraw the forces that had continually patrolled the plantation areas and adjacent villages.
  207. Indonesian Legal Aid Institute (LBH), Laporan Tahunan: Kantor Lembaga Bantuan Hukum Palembang [Annual Report: Palembang Legal Aid Institute Office] (Palambang, South Sumatra, 1994), pp. 32-33.
  208. Indonesian Legal Institute (LBH), Urgent Action: The expansion of industrial forestation and the establishment of a pulp and paper factory which seize local communities’ lands and rapes and violate the law and human rights (Palambang, South Sumatra, 1996), pp. 2-4. (Unpublished “Action Alert” on file with author.)
  209. Peluso, Rich Forests, Poor People, passim.
  210. Ministry of Forestry, Utilization of the Reforestation Fund, Working Paper No. 2, Mid-Term Report: Forestry Sector Policy Analysis, Forestry Sector Study (ADB Project Preparation Technical Assistance T.A. No. 1781-INO, 1994), pp. 7 and 10.
  211. The funding is to be used to develop a 70-seat turbo-prop aircraft, the N-250, a project which had already consumed $650 million in state funds. The loan is to be paid back through a 5 percent royalty on each N-250 sold, which will require IPTN to sell 281 of them at the currently estimated sale price of $13.5 million. The marketability of the N-250 is thus crucial to whether the funds will ever be paid back. The Asian Wall Street Journal notes, however, that “some critics, including the World Bank, have suggested that IPTN may never become commercially viable” (R. Pura, “Suharto Lawyers Ask Court to Reject Suit Over Decree,” Asian Wall Street Journal [November 1, 1994], p. 1).
  212. Ibid.
  213. G.N. Munthe and R. Hindryati, “Apkindo Under Fire,” Indonesian Business Weekly (March 6, 1995), p. 5.
  214. Pura, “Bob Hasan Builds an Empire in the Forest,” Asian Wall Street Journal (November 1, 1994), p. 1.
  215. Schwarz, A Nation in Waiting, pp. 305-306.
  216. There has been some speculation in the past year that Soeharto’s eldest daughter, well-known businesswoman Siti Hardijanti Rukmana (known as “Mbak Tutut”) may come forward as a candidate to succeed her father, but barring that scenario — unlikely given the growing resentment in various elite factions towards the influence of the Soeharto children — the new president will surely be a man.
  217. World Bank, Indonesia: Environment and Development, pp. 14-25.
  218. GOI, Indonesia Forestry Action Programme.
  219. World Bank, Indonesia Forestry Sector Review, p. 5.
  220. GOI, Indonesia Forestry Action Programme, p. 57.
  221. Jack Goldstone, Revolution and Rebellion in the Early Modern World (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1991), p. 32, passim.
  222. Barber, Johnson, and Hafild, Breaking the Logjam, pp. 44-47, passim.
  223. World Bank, Indonesia: Stability, Growth and Equity in Repelita VI, p. 111.
  224. In a March 1996 meeting with Commissioners and Panelists of the World Commission on Forests and Sustainable Development Asia Hearing, which the author attended, President Soeharto spoke at length about the high priority he places on the Central Kalimantan peat swamp project, and the wisdom of financing it with the Reforestation Fund. The irony of using “reforestation” funds to clear forests for agriculture did not seem to enter his calculations and was not raised by any other participants in the meeting.
  225. Goldstone, Revolution and Rebellion, p. 487.
  226. Schwarz, A Nation in Waiting, p. 306.
  227. Barber, Johnson, and Hafild, Breaking the Logjam, p. 20.
  228. Peluso, Rich Forests, Poor People, pp. 235-250.
  229. Schwarz, A Nation in Waiting, pp. 306-307.
  230. Homer-Dixon, “The Ingenuity Gap,” p. 591.
  231. Ibid., p. 595.
  232. United Nations Environment Program (UNEP), Global Biodiversity Assessment (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1995), pp. 275-326.
  233. Schwarz, A Nation in Waiting, p. 306.
Summary
Section 1 and 2
Section 3
Section 4
Section 5
Notes

Project on Environmental Scarcities, State Capacity, & Civil Violence